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  1Abstract 
 
Scholars of normative power Europe (NPE) have successfully demonstrated how the 
European Union has gradually emerged as a changer of norms in the international system. 
But more work is needed also to understand the principles of action that reorganized the 
relationships among Europeans themselves and made NPE possible. This essay argues for 
a hermeneutical approach that draws from Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor and Hannah 
Arendt. By taking seriously the self-understanding of those whose political lives it seeks 
to explain, hermeneutics renews the understanding of concepts and practices, such as 
European reconciliation(s), community and reunification that otherwise too easily morph 
into meaningless slogans. Confronting the words and deeds of European founders (at the 
elite and popular level) with the reflections of post WWII thinkers such as Arendt, Isaiah 
Berlin, Karl Jaspers and Jürgen Habermas can yield important insights. The empirical 
work relies on memoirs and autobiographies, 70 long interviews, treaty and policy texts 
(1950 – 2005). 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2Introduction 
  
Note to the reader: This essay constitutes the draft of the first of two chapters attached to 
the book proposal I am completing on the ethical politics of European integration. I 
included here some of the evidence, which comes in the second chapter, to make the 
argument more persuasive. But this gives a “certain breathless” quality to the essay and 
I am aware that a number of points (from the literature review to my “principles of 
action”) deserve more development. Nevertheless I hope that you will find this essay 
thought provoking.  
 
My work is an attempt to “retrieve” the ethical and political impulses behind the 
fifty year-old European integration process by interpreting philosophically the words and 
actions of some its founders.
i  This approach, which is quite common in the study of 
American political roots, may seem less applicable to European integration, which is 
often described as a technocratic enterprise.
ii Yet repeatedly policies have been 
implemented which are questionable from the narrow point of view of economic self-
interest or national power politics. This is not to say that European integration is a purely 
idealistic project or that instrumental and strategic considerations have not played a 
crucial role. Ethical commitments by themselves do not explain political action and 
political outcomes, if anyone was foolhardy enough to assert such a proposition after 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. But much of the scholarship on European 
integration tends to overlook the ethical stands required from the political actors involved 
  3in the process, or what Hannah Arendt would call their “political principles and 
practices.”
iii  
The fact that former enemy nations could pool the production and marketing of 
coal and steel in the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) only six years 
after the end of a murderous conflict is often taken for granted or justified by economic 
calculations.
iv Such accounts do not explain adequately how participants in the European 
founding dealt with their historical memories of war, invasion and mutual exploitation, 
and how they could trust one another enough to put their war industries under a common 
authority with no hegemonic power mediating conflicts. As a result, the much-touted 
“European reconciliation” remains a concept, devoid of concreteness and with little 
apparent relevance to current conflicts. Neither has there been enough attention paid to 
how European Founders understood community, a word laden with emotional and 
affective connotations that they chose very deliberately to name their highly technocratic 
enterprise. Revisiting the negotiations of the European Economic Community helps shed 
light on the conceptual break with an ancient understanding of political power that was 
effected rather unselfconsciously at the time: it was to be “action in concert” rather than 
domination over the other. Finally, I suggest that the Hegelian concept of recognition 
might be a more useful lens to interpret the meaning of the accession to the EU of 12 new 
Member States since 2004 than the concepts of enlargement, reunification or, worst, 
“absorption.”  
Exploring the ethical politics of European integration is important for scholarly 
purposes, but it matters also politically. Voluntary associations such as the EU rest on a 
sense of common identity formed around ideals and traditions, as well as on material and 
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confusion as to what this common tradition might be.
v The heated debates leading to the 
French and Dutch rejections of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe illustrate 
this lack of common understanding. Moreover, scholars and public figures engaged in 
conflict-resolution efforts often cite European integration as a model to follow.
vi But 
what is to be emulated? Specific economic policies and legal arrangements may not be 
transferable. However, issues of trust and truth-telling, of personal and collective 
accountability for past deeds, of the tension between economic and political imperatives 
are not unique to the European context. Focusing on the self-understanding of important 
actors in the process can help illuminate a more hidden yet vital factor for the success of 
the enterprise. As Andrew Moravcsik writes, it is important to “generalize” the European 
experience because, “By subsuming European integration wherever possible under 
general theories, rather than treating it as sui generis, we invite outsiders to treat its 
lessons as relevant to their own experience.”
vii Moravcsik concludes that the European 
experience fits the Liberal rather than the Realist view of International Relations because 
it has been driven primarily by the “commercial interests” of the nation-states involved. 
My point of view is different. I interpret the European “experience” as a political theorist, 
and I assume that commercial interests, however important, are too simple an explanation 
for this complex phenomenon.
viii  
  This is, in any case, less a work of explanation than a work of memory and 
interpretation. As Paul Ricoeur reminds us, founding stories help ground the political 
community. Those narratives, that may consist in fictional or historical accounts, remain 
open for rectification and retelling as the debates on the meaning of the French 
  5Revolution or the German Historikerstreit demonstrate.
ix What is striking in the case of 
European integration is that the accounts are almost entirely missing. Where are the 
“stories” of the Coal and Steel community or the Treaty of Maastricht or the 
enlargements? There is little memory although there is history. What is the difference? 
For Ricoeur, the work of memory is an “ambition,” an attempt to be “faithful to the past,” 
an action-oriented responsibility of citizenship, whereas history, the task of professional 
historians, aims at truth. Both are needed, and what links them is the testimony of those 
who can say, “I was there! Believe me or not. And if you do not believe me, ask someone 
else!”
x Ricoeur wishes for a “happy memory,” that is a memory reconciled to the tragic 
roots of all political foundings, which are born out violence. Such a memory is a hard-
won gift, granted to those who have done the work of mourning – of imputability when 
necessary - and moved beyond melancholia, a paralyzing denial of loss, which Freud 
analyzed in Mourning and Melancholia. This is what makes the “capable human being.” 
So we may ask: could the lack of European memory be due partly to an all too successful 
exorcism of the past?
xi I leave the question open; the need for European memory(ies), 
constitutive of identity, remains. 
There is, of course, no direct access to identity for any subject, singular or 
collective. The road from self to self is through the other and never reaches the Hegelian 
promised land. “To interpret meaning is, for Ricoeur, to arrive in the middle of an 
exchange which has already begun and in which we seek to orient ourselves in order to 
make new sense of it.” This exchange takes place “in the midst of various long 
intersubjective relations, mediated by various social institutions groups, nations and 
cultural traditions:” it leads the individual to a kind of “second naïveté,” propitious for 
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xii So, how to interpret (or “generalize”) the European 
experience in a manner respectful of the intents of its initiators, yet analytical and 
critical? Twentieth century political thinkers who took seriously the challenge of 
rebuilding a world in ruins have created some of the “long intersubjective relations,” in 
the midst of which hermeneutics can deploy its best effects. Hannah Arendt’s reflections 
on natality, plurality, forgiveness and promise, and the responses of Arendtian scholars 
provide me with my main interpretative categories.
xiii I also draw from Isaiah Berlin’s 
discussion of pluralism, Karl Jaspers’ exploration of collective responsibility, Jürgen 
Habermas’ discourse ethics, Charles Taylor’s recognition and István Bibó’s reflections 
on the cultures of shame and responsibility.  
Ricoeur insists, “All memory is of the past.”
xiv Isn’t this rather obvious? 
Ricoeur’s concern is that the hard work of recollecting the past must be kept carefully 
separate from experiencing the present or expecting the future. Go to the past to 
understand the past, he tells us. This is less a temporal than a psychological distinction, 
an attempt to keep interpretations of the past “faithful to the past” (as lived experiences), 
as undistorted by current sensations and/or anticipations of the future as possible. 
Memoirs, essays and interviews of European leaders and citizens abound and constitute a 
rich source of information regarding the European common past. Self-reflection has not 
been lacking either, but due to the controversial nature of integration politics, it has often 
been considered a type of propaganda, which should only concern proponents of 
integration politics. But for interpretive work, which seeks to discover the meaning of 
practices in specific social contexts, identity has everything to do with self-interpretation. 
As Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor argues, a crucial feature of human agency “is 
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we stand on this.”
xv This is why it seems appropriate to study how European initiators 
understood their work and purposes. I propose to interpret their “speech and deeds” as 
texts of political theory, an old tradition in nation-states.  
Ever since the early constitutional debates between the Federalists and anti-
Federalists, Americans have been articulating a political tradition grounded in the words 
and deeds of the Republic’s founders. This is Arendt’s approach in On Revolution, a 
controversial phenomenological comparison of the French and American Revolutions 
that takes as its starting point the change in meaning of words – revolution, power, 
authority – “not because conceptual language reveals the phenomenon in any 
straightforward way, but because, as Heidegger maintained, words carry the record of 
past perceptions, true or untrue, revelatory or distorting.” Many critics have noted the 
somewhat “fabled” character of Arendt’s rendition of the American Revolution. But 
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl argues that Arendt was not writing a history or distinguishing 
types of revolution, rather she wanted to “present an ideal for practice.”
 xvi  
Ricoeur is more willing to concede that political action rarely attains its initial 
purpose than Arendt in On Revolution. His hermeneutical treatment of memory, history 
and imagination traces a middle course between the thickets of uncritical memory and the 
wasteland of a hermeneutics of suspicion. Mourning confronts you with the concreteness 
of life. After her experience of Nazism, Arendt will deliberately turn away from 
philosophy to articulate a political theory that meets the requirements of action in times 
of crisis, from totalitarianism to the Vietnam War.
xvii Following a great personal loss, 
Paul Ricoeur responds to tragedy with a renewed focus on phronesis, that form of 
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emphasis on common action rather than common culture shaped the European founders’ 
first initiatives.
xviii Like Arendt and Ricoeur – albeit in a very different manner - they are 
moved by an urgency borne out of tragedy, and this may explain some of the affinities 
between thinkers and actors, which I hope to make apparent.  
In the past decade, normative inquiries on European integration have multiplied. 
In the next section I discuss briefly some of the most thought-provoking exemplars to 
explain what a work of memory may add to these inquiries. In the second half of this 
paper, I return to Arend and Ricoeur to justify my own emphasis on “principles of action” 
and I tell a few “stories” of these principles at work. I conclude by critiquing some of the 
clichés of European integration. I include an appendix on methodology with my 1999 
questionnaire. 
 
European identity and  “Visions of the Good:” Scholarly Responses 
In spite of its predictive aspirations, the study of political phenomena tends to 
reflect change rather than precede it. The “positivist” paradigms of neo-functionalism and 
liberalism in the Anglo-Saxon world, and legal studies on the European continent, largely 
shaped the field of European integration studies until the end of the twentieth century. 
But the democratization of decision-making processes with their many fractious 
referenda, and the transformation of American foreign policy after 9/11, have made the 
exploration of questions of public ethics and political identity more urgent, prompting 
also much self-reflection on methodological commitments by scholars of the EU.
xix  
  9    Some of the first scholars to ponder European citizens’ disorientation and 
disaffection concluded that “shared values” could give European citizens a sense of their 
common identity.
xx So did political leaders although few would call today for a “soul for 
Europe.”
xxi German historian Wolfgang Schmale argues that Europe suffers from a 
“myth deficit:” it has never articulated its goals clearly in a way which could enlist the 
allegiance of citizens. Daniela Obradovic defines the missing myth as a set of symbolic 
values “through which people share an idea of origin, continuity, historical memories, 
collective remembrance, common heritage and tradition as well as a common destiny.”
xxii 
The word myth, however, carries some dark connotations; too often a myth served to 
seduce people into foolish collective adventures. This is why I prefer here the Arendtian 
word “principle” and I will return to this later. 
In Europe: A Nietzschean Perspective, Stefan Elbe critiques brilliantly the various 
attempts to articulate a new ethos for Europe, which he sees as so many straight jackets 
or “ascetic ideals.” From a Nietzschean perspective, Europeanization would not manifest 
itself primarily through an institution or a political project. Instead, we should look for 
Nietzche’s “good Europeans,” autonomous human beings who experiment with “new 
dispositions toward existence.” The stress on action rather than rigid ideals is well taken, 
but there is an “enigmatic” character to the good Europeans’ free thoughts, which 
disquietens.
xxiii Isn’t Elbe asking too little from political actors? Personal autonomy could 
give play to nationalistic impulses just as much as transcending them. There is a certain 
emptiness to freedom talk that calls for more substantive commitments. But what are the 
standards of normative assessment for a project whose major actors affirm that, “there is 
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integration. Europe is simply of the future”? 
xxiv The author exploring reality may eschew 
distinctions between true and false, “something can be both true and false,” but, as 
Harold Pinter writes, the citizen who must act cannot. 
xxv Paradoxically, the other 
dilemma of a very open-ended value talk is that it lends itself to a moral perfectionism 
that may require too much from political actors instead of too little. Jacques Derrida’s list 
of the nine duties involved in “what is proper for Europe…as a heading for the universal 
essence of humanity” and its “double contradictory imperatives” is an exhaustive and 
somewhat intimidating enumeration of contradictory ideals to any person minimally 
aware of human frailties (difference and universality, accepting the alterity of foreigners 
and integrating them, etc.).
xxvi  
How then to skirt the obstacles of relativism and excessive idealism that may 
paralyze action rather than prod it? One way is to study normative issues more 
empirically. Ian Manners who coined the term Normative Power Europe (NPE) backs his 
argument on the EU’s capacity to set international norms by non-violent means by 
reviewing EU advocacy of the abolition of the death penalty across the globe.
xxvii The 
divergent contributions to the 2006 special issue on European foreign policy in The 
Journal of European Public Policy are evidence of a broadening critical debate on NPE 
although my brief summary cannot do justice to it: Frederica Bicchi critiques the EU 
Mediterranean policies as “unreflexively Eurocentric,” and Adrian Hyde-Price dismisses 
the notion of European Normative Power from a “realist” standpoint. In the bipolar 
international system during the Cold War, the EEC never constituted a new form of 
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issues.” For her part, Helene Sjursen queries whether the absence of armed force suffices 
to render EU normative power non-hegemonic. But Erik Oddvar Eriksen assumes that 
international law, like domestic law, must be backed by some coercive means such as 
sanctions; so force need not mean hegemony. Michael Smith concludes that there is today 
a “co-constitutive” relationship between the internal development of European foreign 
policy (EFP) and the broader development of international issues and structures; he also 
warns against the putative danger of EFP becoming overly self-absorbed; there is no way 
out of the messiness of international responsibilities.
xxviii  
But, even if the EU acts like a normative power in the international sphere, this 
will not necessarily generate a stronger sense of shared identity among its citizens. It is 
notoriously difficult to “democratize” foreign policy - Manners acknowledges that the 
EU drive to abolish the death penalty across the globe came from elite decisions with 
little involvement or interest on the part of EU public opinion.
xxix While NPE focuses on 
the norms shaping the outreach of the EU, it tends to bracket the source of these 
motivations as the black box of EU studies. That agreement on basic norms within the 
EU is taken for granted by some of the scholars of NPE is perfectly justifiable, given the 
wide adherence to the Copenhagen criteria as benchmarks for accession and membership. 
But the connection between national and European identity remains an important topic 
for research. 
This is a challenge, which Glyn Morgan takes on boldly in The Idea of a 
European Superstate by arguing that the “international ramifications” of the arguments 
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could help the European peoples decide whether they want to take on a common 
European project, and, if yes, what kind. Concerns for individual and national security 
carry logical and normative force whereas arguments of economic efficiency may be too 
hard to grasp and fail the democratic standard of justification of “accessibility” (the 
argument must be understandable to the average citizen); arguments of social welfare fail 
the standard of publicity and sufficiency (there is no guarantee that the EU may protect 
its citizens better from ill-effect of globalization than the nation-state). In a world where 
the United States, China and Russia will continue to guard jealously their sovereignty, 
only Europe can balance other superpowers by becoming a superstate (in effect a federal 
polity), which protects its external sovereignty by reinforcing its “internal sovereignty.” 
Though the federal option may seem a pipe-dream, Morgan considers the “security-based 
argument” the most “plausible” and the only one that might convince people that they 
need a European level of government. This pragmatic approach leaves concerns of shared 
identity in the background. However, if European institutions prove their efficacy, 
Morgan sees no reason why peoples who shifted the horizon of their loyalties from the 
local to the national, could not again accept new and more all-encompassing forms of 
political membership.
xxx  
Moral theory in the Western tradition has often combined two approaches, one 
modeled on law, with categorical demands at its center, and the other based on precepts 
for living the good life with prudence and fortitude.
xxxi In many respects, Morgan’s 
argument follows the first model. Like Charles R. Beitz, Peter Singer, Onora O’Neill, or 
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important issues, here a standard for democratic justification, which is the security 
argument.
xxxii Jürgen Habermas’ constitutional patriotism combines both approaches: a 
set of clearly defined principles backed by law and the idea that the modern democratic 
state rests on the supportive spirit of citizens oriented toward the common good. This 
probably inspired the authors of the Preamble to the Constitution for Europe who worked 
painstakingly on the common values defining the EU’s collective identity.
xxxiii  
Current events suggest, however, that utilitarian justifications, constitutional 
reforms and abstract moral arguments are not enough to motivate citizens to participate. 
As Aristotle wrote long ago, citizens need to practice the kind of virtue and rationality 
appropriate to the maintenance of the particular kind of constitution under which they 
live.
xxxiv This form of rationality requires an “understanding” of the original ethical 
commitments underpinning a political enterprise. Arendt’s definition of understanding is 
“to try to be at home in the world.” Understanding leads to “meaning.”
xxxv As a political 
theorist, I would like to shed some “understanding,” on the process of European 
integration. Arendt shied away from general moral principles, which would limit human 
natality (or creativity), and plurality (or diversity). For her there were no prepolitically 
formed values, no ultimate truth, and no “invisible hand” of history. Rather than starting 
from general principles, she took a historical approach and reflected on the lessons to be 
drawn from a lived human experience: the Holocaust, Stalinism, the French Revolution, 
and the American Revolution. Here men have acted; what can we understand? What is 
the “meaning” of their action? This approach seems especially well suited to a reflection 
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commitment to create a different future for Europe. The enterprise was, and still is, an 
experiment.  
 
Imagination and “Principles of Action”  
There are affinities between memory and imagination, two mental capacities 
which both void absence and distance; therefore imagination has a visualizing function 
worth celebrating: it gives “something to be seen,”
xxxvi even if it can also mislead to the 
fanciful or mythical. In On Revolution Hannah Arendt traces back the “tradition” of the 
American Revolution to the “principles” and “practices” of the Founding Fathers - “public 
freedom, public happiness, public spirit.” She celebrates an ethical politics of participation 
and wants us to remember its “heroes,” as she calls those who had the courage to insert 
themselves into the public world. But Arendt did not invent the idea of a political regime’s 
principles of action. She borrows it from Montesquieu who outlined the “principles” 
inherent in each constitutional order in The Spirit of the Laws: love of country and 
equality, or “virtue,” in republics; honor in monarchies; moderation in aristocracies; and 
fear and suspicion in tyrannies. Montesquieu’s political principles are what make each 
specific government “act,” not moral virtues or Christian absolutes.
xxxvii This account 
constitutes a powerful act of imagination; indeed, who has ever seen or quantified such 
principles? Yet it makes sense to think that a tyranny whose people stopped fearing might 
crumble.  As Berlin notes, Montesquieu’s “central notion” is that “individuals and states 
decay when they contravene the rules of their particular ‘inner’ constitution.” 
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although she thought Montesquieu’s list of principles “pitifully inadequate” to account for 
the “rich diversity” of people sharing a common life on earth.
xxxviii  
Arendt bemoaned the fact that “…an allegedly purely theoretical interest in 
political issues has not been the ‘genius’ of American history, but on the contrary, the 
chief reason the American Revolution has remained sterile in terms of world politics.” 
Men of action and men of thought had parted company and Arendt feared that people 
lacking political concepts (or the remembrance of their “principles of action”) would tend 
to rely on far-fetched ideas, which had little relation to the reality of their life. The 
American ethics of public participation had become like a “lost treasure,” displaced by 
civic apathy and consumerism, and state drive for security and stability at all costs. 
xxxix 
The political theorist’s imagination does play a part in the selection of facts. Arendt’s 
nostalgic story of the American founding is controversial not so much for what it says, 
but for what it does not say, about slavery and the American Indians’ demise especially. 
Yet her account motivated American students to take action in the 1960s. Margaret 
Canovan reminds us that Arendt, like Heidegger, had an idiosyncratic way of using 
words, “Principles are not abstract but they are extremely general, inspiring actions 
without prescribing them. They relate to the manner in which people act, and particularly 
to the way they begin to act, the principium that establishes the principle of later action.
xl
Montesquieu and Arendt’s “principles” provide me with a creative way to 
theorize the European founding’s mindsets. These have affinities with practices familiar 
to most people in daily life, but they have relevance also for public life. Like the 
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as a founding, although it did not occur all “at once” or “according to a single plan” and I 
detect three European principles of action: reconciliation, power as action in concert, and 
recognition of the other.
 Such “principles” are more often implied than articulated; and 
when they are expressed in preambles to the treaties and in governmental declarations, it 
is in a language that does not excite the enthusiasm of citizens. The 1950 Schuman 
Declaration that proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) may be an 
exception in this regard, and it mentions all three principles. Reconciliation:  “the age-old 
opposition of France and Germany” and “its sanguinary divisions” must be eliminated; 
Power as action in concert: “the solidarity in production” (of coal and steel) and the 
creation of a new “High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other 
member countries” will be the key to future economic prosperity and security for Europe; 
Recognition of the other: the “organization” is “open to the participation of the other 
countries of Europe” without distinction.
xli Isaiah Berlin suggests that Montesquieu 
conceived his principles as “tentative,” rather like “hypotheses.”
xlii It is with this 
understanding that I discuss the “principles,” which have moved the European integration 
process forward. What follows is a brief summary of my analysis of the European 
principles of action, which I develop at much greater length in my forthcoming book. 
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The principle of reconciliation (chapter 2) 
Reconciliation, so often invoked, is misunderstood perhaps because of its 
complexity. It first deployed its effects in the highly technical Treaty of Paris on the 
ECSC (1951). Karl Jaspers (on the question of guilt) and Arendt provide rich theoretical 
resources to interpret its five constituting practices: breaking with the culture of blame 
forgiving, promising, a fair reorganization of the economic relations between the parties, 
and the benevolent involvement of an external political power together. Shocked by the 
ease with which “good” Germans had shed their Christian values under Nazi rule, Arendt 
stressed action rather than reconciliation.
xliii But, with hard-headed-realism, she 
understood the unpredictable and irreversible consequences of human initiative and 
proposed her own “remedies:” forgiving and promising.
xliv Forgiveness, which is not a 
feeling, but a political capacity, restores the ability to act anew, unconditioned by the 
past. With the faculty of promising, people create “islands of certainty” which allow them 
to treat the future as if it were the present. Their promises are almost always written: 
“laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances.”
xlv  
Arendt supported the European Resistance’s post-War II plans for a Germany 
reintegrated in a federal Europe. But the Schuman Declaration surprised everyone by 
proposing a treaty with a program of economic and social development for the coal and 
steel industries and their workers, and common institutions. The French initiative can be 
interpreted as an act of forgiveness, a radically new proposal to relaunch “action in 
concert,” and a promise. It broke with the culture of blame, which justified the permanent 
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reproach in the Declaration, simply the acknowledgment that France’s twenty-year long 
effort to promote peace and a unified Europe did not succeed. And “we had war.” Some 
Frenchmen acknowledged publicly the historical wounds that their country had inflicted 
upon Germany. Jacques Maritain mentioned the Treaty of Versailles, Robert Schuman 
Napoleon’s imperialistic wars, which in turn “aroused 19
th c German imperialism.”
xlvi 
Few of their fellow citizens endorsed these views, which did not negate German guilt and 
responsibility for WWII. But it made it psychologically and politically feasible to include 
the perpetrator on equal footing in 1950. For his part, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
committed his government to a politics of reparations: between 1949 and 2000 the 
Federal Republic of Germany paid $70 billion to war victims in Europe and the state of 
Israel.
xlvii Forgiveness is controversial both in theory and in practice. For Noam J. Zohar, 
however, the interpersonal process of forgiveness can take place in international relations 
because “the state functions as a vehicle for action of a human collective.” Peter Digeser 
argues that if states can grant collective forgiveness, this would transform the nature of 
the international system, precisely the aim pursued by the founders of the ECSC.
xlviii  
But it is important to note with Lily Gardner Feldman that, beside a “break with 
age-old national animosities,” successful reconciliation policies also rest on a 
“pragmatic” component, which includes programs of economic and political cooperation 
to serve state interests, “security and prosperity.”
xlix Assessments of the economic 
benefits of the ECSC vary. Some call it a success because production and trade in coal 
and steel increased considerably among the six partners; others a failure because it did 
not succeed in dismantling the German steel cartel and in liberalizing trade in coal and 
  19steel fully. But scholars agree that even if “the ECSC actually delivered on only one of its 
promises,” it was “the most important one: it advanced the integration process” and 
“substituted for a peace treaty with Germany.”
l Moreover, by creating a public space 
where German and French actors could relate on equal terms, the treaty facilitated the 
resolution of the thorny issues of the Ruhr status and of the French annexation of the Saar 
territory. 
Finally, international reconciliations frequently involve a benevolent external 
power (or hegemon), willing and able to guarantee the security of the parties. Winning 
the peace hinges on winning the war, yet it is a different project. It may be argued that the 
US acted more like a guardian angel than a hegemon in 1947 when it offered the 
Marshall Plan and supported the creation of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC). The Marshall Plan was structured so as to encourage and stimulate 
European reconciliation and cooperation: the US insisted on an international conference 
chaired by a European, which would draw up the plans for dividing up and investing the 
funds.
li In the fall of 1949, in another act of trust, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
turned to French foreign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman for ideas on the policies that 
should be adopted toward Germany. After eight months, the French government finally 
came up with the Schuman Declaration thanks to a proposal of French Planning 
Commissioner Jean Monnet. Later the US made the first sizable loan to the ECSC, $100 
million at the favorable rate of 3.7%. 
lii
The principle of reconciliation rarely leads to an end state. Once the cornerstone 
of European integration, the French-German reconciliation is no longer an isolated 
example. Since 1989 there have been official reconciliation processes between Germany 
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Turkey have initiated steps toward a rapprochement.
liii Partly because of the success of its 
reconciliatory processes, the EU was capable to become one of the new “hegemons” in 
the Balkans. With the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, it promised that the question of the final status of Kosovo (full-fledged or 
“conditional” independence) would be decided in 2005, a thorny issue, which has yet to 
be adjudicated to the satisfaction of all parties. Have the EU and its representatives drawn 
enough from their “treasure” of reconciliatory practices, from forgiving and promising 
and their experience of “rational” collaborations around common interests, to encourage 
path-breaking initiatives on the part of Serbia and Kosovo’s actors? In 2000 former EU 
Commission President Jacques Delors urged EU leaders to draw from their “treasure” 
and “find in the Balkans, on both sides…the men or the women on whom we could lean 
to face the principle of forgiveness and develop together a promise, of course, with the 
support of nearby regions such as Bulgaria and Romania among others.”
liv When I asked 
whether the tradition of European reconciliations could impact favorably the relationship 
of Greece with Turkey, I raised eyebrows in Brussels and Paris in 1999: the situation 
seemed really too different. But four years later comparisons of the impact of European 
integration on the French-German and the Greek-Turkish relationships no longer seemed 
far-fetched.
lv
The principle of power as action in concert (chapter 3) 
There is more to winning the peace than reconciliation. With the elimination of 
violent conflicts comes the affirmation of a common destiny. The early European actors 
  21launched a daring reconceptualization of power, which the treaties they negotiated were 
meant to symbolize. It was to be “action in concert” rather than domination over the 
other. But isn’t this a privilege reserved to countries that have lost the capacity to impose 
their will? This is Robert Kagan’s argument. While expressing repeatedly his admiration 
for the new European politics of peace, “a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous 
celebration- on both sides of the Atlantic,” Kagan argues that Europeans could step out of 
the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian “paradise” of international law only 
thanks to the military protection of the United States.
lvi Few Europeans would dispute 
Kagan’s point that the European Union must develop a more effective and responsible 
Common Defense Policy
lvii But Arendt contributes to a renewed understanding of 
European power. She defines power as an “organized solidarity,” binding partners on a 
basis of equality and mutuality, not as violence or force. “To an astonishing degree 
independent of material factors, either of numbers or means,” power is both invincible 
and fragile; it “springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment 
they disperse.”
lviii If the European “paradise” was established under US military 
protection, the principle of power as action in concert kept it from lapsing into a mere 
footnote in history books. 
Among political actors, the apprenticeship of power as action in concert surprised, 
even alienated. The negotiations on the ECSC had hardly started at the Quai d’Orsay in 
Paris on June 20, 1950 when the French delegates Monnet, Étienne Hirsch and Pierre Uri 
started arguing with one another. This went on for several days. Dirk Spierenburg, head 
of the Dutch delegation, confided to his assistant Max Kohnstamm: “I am going crazy. 
  22How can I defend the Dutch interest when these idiots do not even know what the French 
interest is?”
lix But Kohnstamm was delighted: “This was totally different from the 
bilateral negotiations we were all used to. Monnet broke through our habits to start 
something that was not a negotiation, but a common search for solutions.” Robert 
Marjolin, a French economist who was the senior civil servant representing France during 
the negotiations of the European Economic Community (EEC) and a member of the first 
EEC Commission, called the ECSC a “school” where the six began learning to work 
together on a basis of equality.
lx  
The 1955-57 negotiations on the European Economic Community constitute a 
case study of power as action in concert. Thanks to seventeen long interviews of the main 
negotiators in 1984, memoirs and essays, we have the story behind the story. These 
documents divulge what official declarations, memoranda and treaties never could reveal: 
how individual political actors changed their own minds, how they persuaded others to 
change their minds in order to pursue these diverse “inter-ests, which lie between people 
and therefore can relate and bind them together.”
lxi It is part of the interpretative 
theorist’s task to expose lacunae and contradictions in the actors’ recollections. Other 
authoritative accounts confirm and complete rather than contradict the facts (though not 
necessarily the interpretations) evoked by the interviewees, whose humorous and often 
self-deprecating tales do not hide quirky behaviors and occasional pettiness.
lxii
Assuredly, accords on the EEC and Euratom could not have been negotiated and 
implemented if they had not corresponded to the fulfillment of national interests and had 
not been approved, at least tacitly, by popular opinion. Circumstances also played their 
role. The Crisis of Suez and the Hungarian revolution of October 1956 convinced the 
  23negotiators, the French in particular, that they could not go it alone anymore and that 
protectionist policies must be altered. But even if securing material benefits for large 
social groups had been the sole aim of policy-makers, there was little unanimity, 
especially in France, as to what such policies should be.
lxiii Furthermore the 
psychological obstacles on the road to such accords among the six were enormous. 
People do not always act in their own best interests. 
European power, like a heavy door, turns on three hinges, the institutions, the 
calendar with its deadlines, and the initiative of political actors. Agreement is much more 
difficult to reach when hundreds or thousands of actors are involved in negotiating what 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis calls a “community of projects.” This is all the more reason to 
remember that the original communities were founded on the conviction that to master 
national destinies is to act in concert. Embracing this new kind of power is not for the 
faint of heart, nor is it an exercise in private virtue. To its inhabitants the “paradise” feels 
more often like a purgatory.
lxiv
The principle of recognition (chapter 4) 
Without recognition of the other, the European Union (before 1992 the European 
Communities) could not have “enlarged” from six to twenty-seven Member States in 
thirty years. The Treaties of Rome’s signatories called “upon the other peoples of Europe 
who share their ideal to join in their efforts.”
lxv The major contemporary theorist of 
recognition, Charles Taylor, analyzes from his standpoint as a bilingual Quebecois deeply 
engaged in Canadian politics and as a scholar of Hegel the process of interactions, which 
facilitates the coming together of parties previously opposed (or merely disconnected). 
  24The new association, far from abolishing the parties, helps them toward a higher stage of 
individual and collective self-realization. This is the goal, if not the reality, of EU 
enlargement, a neologism for the peaceful expansion of a “union” of democratic nation-
states, driven not by a pre-established plan, but by the requests of outsiders to join.  
In a world where social and international hierarchies have collapsed among 
individuals and groups - this is the case of the European continent - the shaping of 
identity does not follow automatically or exclusively from one’s status at birth, but it 
depends also on a dialogue of recognition among equals. Taylor argues that 
contemporary individuals and collectivities are torn between two impulses. The first is 
“the search of authenticity,” their specific and unique calling, which recognition by the 
other supports (whereas the refusal to grant recognition can have severe psychological 
and political consequences). The second impulse is instrumental rationality, which prizes 
efficacy and productivity over all else, even at the cost of shared tradition.
lxvi The 
successive enlargements represent both a rational effort to modernize Europe and the 
vocation to create a new European order open to all. But in this ceaselessly changing EU, 
Member States, Candidate States and their citizens experience rude challenges to their 
sense of identity. In this context, institutions and policies matter: they embody the 
granting (or withdrawal) of recognition so necessary to the self-realization of the 
community members.
lxvii Certain EU policies, such as the programs of economic and 
social cohesion, and institutional arrangements (the rotating presidency) have facilitated 
mutual recognition among Member States, which is predicated on the equality of 
treatment and status and a continuous flow of verbal, political and economic exchanges.  
  25Dialogues of recognition, which can only succeed among equals, require a 
horizon of shared values according to Taylor. In the EU since 1993 the Copenhagen 
criteria for accession have constituted this horizon: democratic rights, a functioning 
market economy, and the acquis communautaire.
lxviii The European Council decided to 
begin accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. This process has advanced 
by fits and starts. Meanwhile Croatia and Macedonia have also become official Candidate 
Countries. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia “including Kosovo” 
are all “potential candidate countries.”
lxix Faced with some 90.000 pages of acquis 
communautaire and 27 interlocutors, is there any possibility for the Candidate Countries 
(actual and potential) to experience the give and take of the dialogue of recognition? Are 
the Member States open to the possibility that this dialogue will transform them also?  
The common feature of these three European principles of action is that they 
engage the Other - sometimes a rival or an enigma, never an enemy - on the basis of 
mutuality, with a view to common long-term interests and the willingness to enter 
binding commitments. Reconciliation, power as action in concert and recognition of the 
other need not inspire every policy. They should rather be considered as a logical 
necessity inscribed in the psychology of the citizens and their representatives if the 
community is to last. The expansion of direct democracy in the EU calls for more civic 
involvement, on a knowledgeable basis. This constitutes a formidable pedagogical 
challenge, which has yet to be met adequately by EU leaders in spite of the respected 
Commission vice-president in charge of communication strategy Margot Wallström’s 
repeated calls for action.
lxx Yet numerous grassroots groups moved the reconciliatory 
process after WWII; since 1989, beside politicians and bureaucrats, academics, students, 
  26workers and journalists have engaged in the dialogue of recognition across borders.
lxxi 
Provided with enough evidence, many more EU citizens might identify with the core 
practices of the European “treasure.” 
 
Testimonies  
Who remembers? For Arendt the founding of new political communities is an 
exciting but ephemeral time of “natality.” With a matchless appreciation for the 
uniqueness of each individual actor, as she calls those who have the courage to insert 
themselves into the human world, she describes the “heroes” as the subjects of stories 
which eventually form the “storybook of mankind.”
lxxii The meaning of the story can 
never be told by the agent, who reveals himself in action but cannot decipher its meaning; 
it “is revealed only when the action itself has come to an end and become a story 
susceptible to narration.”
lxxiii Storytelling is one form of thinking that does not trump 
acting. It allows political actors to share with others their understanding of an experience, 
thus making themselves “at home in the world among others” and renewing possibilities 
for action in concert. Selection of facts is the historian’s prerogative. What matters is that 
the story be probable and possible. Ricoeur writes of the “plausibility” of the 
testimony.
lxxiv
    As I “retrieve” European ideals from the memoirs, essays and interviews of 
European Founders and their successors, I am well aware that such works are always in 
part self-justificatory acts. But writings by major political actors may provide us with 
some of the most politically salient contemporary political theory. This is, of course, 
  27nothing new. Men of action, such as Machiavelli, Locke, Burke, and Tocqueville used the 
pen to comment on the conduct of public affairs. But European founders did not reflect at 
length on their motivations. So it is up to the historian of political thought to interpret the 
meanings of their words and deeds.
lxxv In this work I recall certain “stories” about 
European integration told by political actors in interviews, memoirs and autobiographies, 
and by biographers and historians of European integration. This allows me to retrieve 
how these actors understood and justified their political actions, but also, using “the 
backward glance of the historian,” to bring my own interpretations of these stories and to 
confront them with the views of contemporary actors of European integration.
lxxvi No 
doubt there is a certain naiveté in doing so. Moreover, should we not be done with any 
account that reminds us even remotely Hegel’s “world-historical figures?” Political 
scientists have been reluctant to focus on leadership, a concept not easily quantifiable and 
which can lead to oversimplified interpretations of politics as being driven by “great 
men.” But historically political foundings seem to result from action by small groups of 
initiators. I define leadership here as the capacity to initiate political action; and although 
many of the political actors featured in this work are elected politicians or senior 
administrators, others are actively engaged citizens. As Ricoeur writes, “To put it bluntly, 
we have nothing better than memory to signify that something has taken place, has 
occurred, has happened before we declare that we remember.…testimony constitutes the 
fundamental transitional structure between memory and history.”
lxxvii
Memory can torment or prompt to action, and most often it does both. The 
hermeneutical circle starts from the memories of witnesses, progresses through history 
whose methods challenge the veracity of these testimonies and circles back to memory, 
  28now an “educated memory illuminated by historiography.” Representations of the past 
constitute a symbolic universe, which contribute to the creation of social bonds that 
eventually become like a habitus or sensus communis. The dangers of an “instructed” (or 
endoctrinated) memory – that turns into an ideology serving the established order - 
always lurks, but history, by casting suspicion over every testimony, can act as much as a 
poison as a remedy. It asks for documentary proofs, but also opens ups “spaces of 
controversy within which several testimonies and several witnesses found themselves 
confronted with one another.” Ultimately much rests upon the witness who must also be 
willing to say repeatedly: “I was there, I can attest to this.” Repetition marks the 
trustworthy witness, transforming testimony into a form of “promise-making.” It makes 
the “capable man” according to Ricoeur. 
lxxviii  
But two challenges arise: the first concerns these “limit experiences,” of which it 
is almost impossible to testify. How to speak of Auschwitz’ gas chambers? The second is 
just as daunting (and not necessarily separate): what about the witnesses who “never 
encounter an audience capable of listening to them or hearing what they have to say?”
lxxix 
Limit experiences escape “ordinary understanding.” In the Westphalian system of 
nations-states, negotiating agreements with a view to a federal Europe and to the 
abolition of war was hardly a limit experience. Yet it was new, perhaps even “extra-
ordinary,” but did the negotiators want an audience beyond their peers? It does not seem 
to have crossed their minds beyond the well-rehearsed process of parliamentarian 
approval. Of course, foreign policy decisions never depended on popular approval. The 
growing recourse to referenda on European issues is a recent innovation, which makes 
testimonies on European integration more important since they could help civic 
  29“understanding.” However, if testimonies are to help constitute the social bond, the main 
question is their veracity. Can they be trusted?  
  The question of trustworthiness is a core issue in democratic politics. I switch in 
last third of my book from an essentially retrospective mode of theorizing to a more 
prescriptive mode to reflect on the principles of “truth-telling” and “thoughtfulness.” 
Although this may sound like pie in the sky, there are “stories” to be told of these 
principles at work. In Chapter 5 on the democratic deficit in the EU, and especially its 
cognitive and participatory dimensions, I argue that “truth-telling” (of the leaders) must 
encounter “right-speaking” (by the people) to shape European democratic politics. I 
examine whether the founding of the EU satisfied or, on the contrary, failed the test of 
Habermas’ discourse ethics and to what extent the European Parliament has become a 
“communication community.” In chapter 6, I focus on another challenge brought about 
by democratization to argue that the lack of persuasive speech about European integration 
masks another more fundamental problem: thoughtlessness. At the dawn of the 21st 
century the EU could easily fall victim to its own success by undertaking too many new 
programs without enough consideration. As its stability seems endangered by the very 
dynamism of the processes it starts, only more deeply reflective politics will allow 
leaders and citizens to make themselves at home in the world. Although Monnet was 
hardly introspective, he took pains to outline his method for thinking the new in his 
Memoirs; and there are other testimonies of the principle of thoughtfulness.
lxxx Arendt 
stressed action in times of crisis, but she reemphasized the importance of judgment (or 
phronesis) for politics at the end of her life. Judgment - to Arendt - was not only about 
rational mental operations, but more like Kant’s silent sense, which in “practical and 
  30moral matters” does not judge, but tells you “what to do, what not to do.” Only an 
“’understanding heart,” – Arendt called it also “imagination” or the capacity to think 
from a diversity of points of view – “not mere reflection or mere feeling, makes it 
bearable for us to live with other people, strangers forever, in the same world, and makes 
it possible for them to bear with us.” (The French translation “coeurs intelligents” is 
perhaps more evocative).
lxxxi The problem with the “good Germans” under Nazism is that 
they did not think through their “values,” but answered to “stock phrases” and 
“conventional standardized codes of expression and conduct,” which “have the socially 
recognized functions of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claims on our 
thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence.” 
lxxxii
 
Norms or Clichés? 
As time passes, principles of action may form a “tradition.” Yet, if they are not 
remembered “faithfully,” their concreteness fades from memory and they stop inspiring 
thoughtful action. In times of crisis, the political consequences are grave. Only clichés 
remain: trite, stereotyped expressions that have lost their originality and impact by long 
overuse, (a form of “abuse,” which need not negate their original use). Since the end of 
the Cold War, reconciliation has become the new mantra of European integration. The 
EU’s first stated “objective” in the 2004 Constitution for Europe is to “promote peace, its 
values” that follows the Preamble’s open acknowledgment of “bitter experiences” and 
“former divisions.” Unfortunately nowhere is peace defined, and the Constitution is not a 
citizen-friendly handbook for its promotion. Even in France, there is little memory about 
  31Europe as a peace enterprise. Étienne Balibar describes the European Communities as 
“essentially the by-product, and part of the mechanism, of the Cold War.”
lxxxiii And 
Jacques Attali calls the ECSC “easy to conceive and to implement;” this is surprising 
given the irreversible consequences of action: during the Occupation, the Germans 
extracted the equivalent of 48% of the French 1939 GNP in annual payments; 200.000 
French men and women did not return from Germany after the war ended.
lxxxiv But André 
Glucksmann expresses a widely shared puzzlement regarding the Founding Father’s 
motivations: they acted in deafening “silence,” without explanation, and built the new 
Europe on “tangible” foundations such as the productivity index, trade, and investment. 
Meanwhile, the reconciliation, “so often celebrated,” has yet to be thought through.
lxxxv  
How is it that highly trained French public figures such as Catherine Lalumière 
and Elizabeth Guigou discovered the reconciliatory ethos of European integration only 
after joining the Mitterrand presidency?
lxxxvi French economist Jean Fourastié stresses 
that there was never any philosophical conversations around Monnet with whom he 
worked closely. He was a man focused on action, with no time to waste on abstract 
debates. “There was also this notion that we were a very diverse group of men; among us 
some were believers, others not; some loved philosophy, others not. Monnet wanted to 
keep us all on the same level, without tackling complex, difficult problems about which 
people have deep differences. I have the impression that he wanted to limit himself, at 
least with us, to political, administrative and economic problems, which was already a 
considerable undertaking. . . He behaved with us as a man very conscious of the tragic 
side of the human condition . . . The point was to try, starting from these tensions 
between men . . . to limit the dramatic, disorderly character of life.”
lxxxvii Was Monnet’s 
  32reticence a way to deflect painful memories, with the unforeseen result that it would also 
deflect the mourning that Ricoeur associates with faithfulness to the past? I pose a 
question, which Monnet will not answer, but which concerns contemporary Europeans as 
well. 
Although reconciliatory processes in the Balkans could yet become a new chapter 
in the European storybook, as Delors asserts, the sarcastic film of Sarajevo-born director 
Pjer Zalica, Fuse, mocks the reconciliatory pretenses of European bureaucrats. This is the 
story of Tesanj, a small Bosnian-Croatian town on the Serbian border with a mixed 
population who decides to mimic reconciliation to lure international capital with the 
approaching visit of President Clinton. The deception seems one project Tesanj’s divided 
communities can agree on. At one point the elegantly middle-aged German fire brigade 
officer, who represents the international community, pats patronizingly the knee of the 
clever (and crooked) Bosnian town mayor – and tells him, “We reconciled, we have 
confidence in you, you can do it too” - with no apparent sympathy for the mixture of 
humiliation and determination in his interlocutor; this is a top down relationship which 
only shared experiences of defeat, guilt and recovery might help equalize.
lxxxviii 
Reconciliation turns into a moneymaking enterprise, high salaries for international 
bureaucrats and subsidies for the assisted, whereas its original intent was equalizing and 
rooted in the divided communities. Could a European memory, “faithful to the past,” 
express more self-reflection and acknowledgment of one’s responsibility, and forgiveness 
and promise around common economic interests?  
  33Faithfulness to the past would note also that the European reconciliation(s) did not 
originate with the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, as it is often argued, but with the treaty 
on the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951. Why should this matter? Because 
the process was from the start multilateral rather than bilateral; small countries played a 
vital role, providing ideas, venues and leadership; state interests were always considered 
legitimate, yet negotiable. The idea of a French-German consortium (with Britain for 
good measure) with special claim to leadership is contrary to the original impulses of 
European integration. 
The much-vilified “Monnet method” has become another cliché to describe the 
technocratic processes, which bind the community’s participants in the straight jacket of 
economic interest with little sense of democratic accountability. This to overlook the 
facts, for instance that Monnet’s Pleven Plan in 1952 proposed a European Defense 
Community with a Political Community and European representative institutions. 
Monnet was genuinely dismayed when the French National Assembly refused to ratify 
the Treaty on the Defense Community in 1954. The neo-functionalist turn is really taken 
in 1955 with the negotiations on the European Economic Community, a project, which 
initially Monnet did not support. He favored the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom), atomic energy being like coal and steel a vital and strategic resource, whose 
common management would teach the partners once again to rethink their national 
interests in terms of the common interest. Euratom would allow the Europeans to stand 
on their own feet, more independently from the two superpowers, which was a constant 
preoccupation of Monnet in spite of its many friendships and collegial relations in the 
US. The demise of the European Political Community was due to a national decision by 
  34the French. In fact, there is another “European method” that might deserve more 
examination. Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev argues that the challenge in 2007 
is “simple:” to find again a story, a “true fiction” to tell the European peoples. For 
Krastev, who is not well-disposed toward the federalist ideal because the new Member 
States have just regained their sovereignty, the challenge is to reinvent Europe around the 
impact it could have on the “march of the world” in an age of globalization. For this, 
European elites should first admit that after creating the EU, they pushed it “into the 
ditch” by blaming it for all political ills. “We are paying today for making of Europe a 
scapegoat. Refounding Europe demands an admission of guilt.”
lxxxix But why not address 
the past not only as a Debt, which induces guilt, but also as the common legacy? Monnet 
and Schuman had conceived of the ESCS as “a contribution to world peace.” In a 
different vein, this is a “European tradition” that scholars of NEP want to maintain and 
expand as does Krastev.  
“Reunification” is another term that sounds persuasive until one acknowledges 
that Europe was really never unified, but split for over 1500 years between powerful 
empires and large and small states. Because of the constraining nature of the accession 
process, reunification and “enlargement” become all too easily code words for Western 
dominance. Faithfulness to the past, what would it mean in this case? In Western Europe, 
perhaps remembering the profound indifference of many toward their fellow Europeans 
on the other side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War?
xc And in Central and Eastern 
Europe? These questions are important to explore. Taylor’s concept of recognition, which 
designs a process whereby unequal parties can learn, through a tough dialogue, to identity 
  35with each other and to engage in transformation, seems especially relevant to the Europe 
of 27 or more. 
What a work gains in breadth, it may loose in depth. Looking back at fifty-six 
years of European integration I am well aware that much work remains to be done to 
delineate the “principles” at the heart of the European project and that other 
interpretations are quite possible. The work of articulation is never over. As Taylor 
writes, the question of identity is open-ended, not given once for all, a quest as much as a 
state of being. What matters is the “direction” in which we move. For Arendt 
understanding was “unending and therefore cannot produce final results” But this never 
stopped her quest, nor should it stop ours.
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Appendix 
For empirical evidence, I rely on essays, memoirs and long interviews. My 
account of the negotiations of the Treaties of Rome is based primarily on 17 in-depth 
interviews of the main negotiators, conducted by two Italian social scientists, Maria 
Grazia Melchionni and Roberto Ducci in 1984. Research on the contemporary state of the 
European tradition required widening the number of interviewees. In this case, I chose to 
interview primarily members of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2005. The 32 
members of the European Parliament from 15 Member States whom I interviewed in 
1999 represented fairly well the spread between the right and the left, age and gender. I 
interviewed eleven other MEPs in 2002 and 2005 as well as diplomats from The Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia. I do not argue that I have a “representative” sample of 
the EU initiators’ views on the “European tradition,” but rather what Joseph A. Maxwell 
calls a “purposeful” or “criterion-based” sample.
xcii This is a methodological strategy in 
which particular settings, persons, or events are selected deliberately in order to provide 
important information that cannot be obtained as well from other choices (ibid.). MEPs 
must explain and develop the “European tradition” with their electors, and to know their 
mind on issues seemed particularly relevant. I also interviewed Jacques Delors twice, had 
extensive conversations with three close associates of Jean Monnet, three senior level 
Commission officials and one senior legal expert. Finally I had many conversations on 
these matters with citizens from EU Member States and candidate countries 1999-2005. 
To complete this book I am planning more interviews at the European Parliament, 
  37especially with MEPs. from the twelve new Member States. I would like also to enrich 
my theoretical framework by drawing from one or more Eastern or Central European 
thinkers. I mentioned István Bibó’ in this essay; there are many others, of course, and I 
welcome suggestions. One my current references is Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, Esprits 
d’Europe: Autour de Czeslaw Milosz, Jan Patocka, István Bibó (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 
2005), Below find the 1999 questionnaire. I used thoroughly revised questionnaires in 
2002 and 2005. 
 
1999 Questionnaire 
 
1) Do you think that European integration remains a peacemaking project; where do 
enlargement and regionalization fit in this context? 
 
2)Jacques Delors would like enlargement pushed back until the EMU is well in place; 
Timothy Gorton Ash thinks it should be a speedy process for the sake of peace; how 
would you arbitrate this debate? 
 
3) The German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt writes that a political community 
rests on the human capacity for speech and action, but also on the ability to promise and 
forgive; it seems clear that promise and forgiveness played a role in the early years of 
European integration. Do you agree; is this role still needed today? 
 
4) Many criticize the process of European integration for its elitist aspect? Do you agree? 
What is the role of the citizen in the enlargement program? 
 
5) The European Community remains the main pillar of the EU. How do you define a 
political community; is this definition applicable to the EU? What are the respective roles 
of the regions, the EU administration and the nation states in this community? 
 
6) How do you visualize an “enlarged” EU? New members are asked to undergo 
significant changes, but how will these new members change the EU? Are the people of 
the EU, and especially of your country, aware of the possible need to change in order to 
enlarge? 
 
7) The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas is a partisan of “constitutional patriotism:” 
Europeans will learn to act and feel as such by accepting the rule of law and common 
institutions. In contrast, Charles Taylor thinks the citizen needs to develop an affective 
  38attachment to the homeland, out of a common history, myths, and traditions. What do you 
think, especially in the light of the experience of your country with the EU? 
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